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Note
Member Bankruptcy Under the New Minnesota
Limited Liability Company Act: An Executory
Contract Analysis
James M. Jorissen
Following a growing national trend, Minnesota introduced
its version of the Limited Liability Company Act (Act) on Jan-
uary 1, 1993.1 A hybrid business entity comprised of attributes
from both the corporation 2 and the partnership,3 the Limited
1. 1992 Minn. Laws Ch. 517, Art. 2 (codified at MIN. STAT. §§ 322B.01-
.955 (Supp. 1993)).
2. The Act's governance and management provisions are derived from
the Minnesota Business Corporation Act (MBCA). MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.001-
.917 (1992). A limited liability company (LLC) differs from a corporation in
three major respects. First, the LLC inherits the termination devices of disso-
lution and winding up from partnership law. Compare MINN. STAT.
§§ 322B.80-.873 (Supp. 1993) (Minnesota Limited Liability Company Act disso-
lution and winding up provisions) with MINN. STAT. §§ 323.28-.31 (1992) (Min-
nesota Uniform Partnership Act dissolution and winding up provisions).
Second, the Act limits company duration to 30 years and provides for dissolu-
tion any time a member departs, in stark contrast to the perpetual duration of
a corporation. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.01, at 30 (West Supp. 1993) (Preface
and Overview Comments to Reporter's Notes). Compare MINN. STAT.
§ 322B.115(1)(4) (Supp. 1993) (specifying a maximum 30 year existence for the
LLC from the time of filing articles of organization with the secretary of state)
with M INN. STAT. § 302A.161(2) (1992) ("A corporation has perpetual dura-
tion."). Third, the Act places certain restraints on the alienation of member-
ship interests, most notably divesting an assignee or transferee of such interest
of governance rights unless all members of the company consent to assign-
ment thereof. See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 322B.306 (Supp. 1993) (termina-
tion of a membership interest); 322B.31 (assignment of financial rights);
322B.313 (assignment of a complete membership interest and of governance
rights coupled with an assignment of financial rights); 322B.873 (disposition of
assets on dissolution). Other differences between the Act and the MBCA are
primarily of form and not substance.
The Act inherits most of the MBCA's governance rules. The Act alters
terminology where appropriate to "reflect ... character differences between a
corporation and a limited liability company." AlN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.01, at
26 (West Supp. 1993) (Preface and Overview Comments to Reporter's Notes).
Thus, the LLC does not have "shares" of stock, "shareholders," "directors," or
"officers," but rather, "membership interests," "members," "governors," and
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Liability Company (LLC)4 affords entrepreneurs the most de-
sirable traits of both forms-the conduit taxation of a partner-
ship5 and the limited liability of a corporation.6 Its attributes
"managers." Id. at 535-36. Semantic quirks aside, similarities between the en-
tities far outweigh differences.
FORMATION
One or more organizers may form the LLC by filing articles of organiza-
tion with the secretary of state. MINN. STAT. § 322B.105 (Supp. 1993); MINN.
STAT. § 302A.101 (1992). The LLC, like a corporation, may be organized for
"any [lawful] business purpose or purposes." MINN. STAT. § 322B.20 (Supp.
1993). The LLC's articles of organization, like articles of incorporation, re-
quire minimal information. By way of comparison, both the MBCA and the
Act require the articles to state the entity's name, address, and the name and
address of a registered agent. See id. § 322B.115; MINN. STAT. § 302A.111
(1992). The MBCA further requires the name and address of the incorpora-
tor(s) and a statement as to the aggregate number of shares authorized for is-
sue. Id. § 302A.111. As a reflection of its divergent character, the LLC's
articles must state the limited duration of the company, an election of mem-
ber's power to avoid dissolution in the event of a member's termination, and a
statement as to whether the members have the power to formulate a business
continuation agreement. MINN. STAT. § 322B.115(1)(4)-(6) (Supp. 1993).
ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION
Beyond the foregoing mandatory provisions, the Act operates to impose
statutory provisions unless specifically excluded in the articles of organization.
Id. § 322B.115(2). Thus, if not excluded or modified in the articles, the Act in-
corporates into the articles provisions pertaining to powers, purposes, voting,
membership interests, distributions, profits and losses, and expulsion of a
member. MINN. STAT. § 302A.111(2) (1992) (listing statutory provisions that
may be modified only in articles of incorporation).
3. The partnership's major contribution to the LLC is its engraftment of
partnership dissolution and winding up procedures on the corporate form.
Figuratively speaking, the LLC lives the life of a corporation and dies the
death of a partnership. See discussion supra note 2; infra notes 26-28, 41-45
and accompanying text.
4. For a treatment of the historical roots of the LLC, see Wayne M.
Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability Company, 41 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 387, 393 & nn.19-26 (1991).
5. For a discussion of the conduit tax treatment of partnership income,
see WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 95 (6th ed. 1988). The Internal Revenue Service accords LLC's
partnership status for purposes of federal income taxation. See Rev. Rul. 88-
76, 1988-2 C.B. 392.
Conduit taxation aside, partnership classification harbors a number of
other tax advantages to members of the LLC. In the event of business loss,
members can use such loss to shelter other income. Furthermore, members
can allocate losses to those having the highest income, thereby minimizing the
taxable income of that member. For a complete discussion of the federal in-
come tax advantages of partnership status, see Gazur & Goff, supra note 4, at
439-54.
6. Compare MINN. STAT. § 322B.303(1) (Supp. 1993) (providing that "[a]
member, governor, manager or other agent of a limited liability company is
not, merely on account of this status, personally liable for the acts, debts, lia-
bilities, or obligations of the limited liability company") with MINN. STAT.
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promise to make the LLC the business vehicle of choice for en-
trepreneurs well into the next century.7
As welcome as the LLC may be to the business community,
it inherits from the partnership form a possible legal infirmity.
The Internal Revenue Code requires enterprises seeking part-
nership tax classification to resemble partnerships. The Act
brings LLC's into conformity for tax purposes by annexing,
from the partnership laws, limitations on the transfer of mem-
ber interests and the life span of the LLC. Critically, like the
Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), the Act effects divestiture of
a member's all-important governance interest on filing for
bankruptcy." The inclusion of these partnership attributes to
evade federal income taxes raises complications in the bank-
ruptcy context.
Bankruptcy courts treat partnership agreements as "execu-
tory contracts."9 The executory classification derives from the
§ 302A.425 (1992) (limiting the liability of a shareholder or owner of a corpora-
tion to payment of a full consideration for shares owned).
7. For a discussion of the LLC's significant tax and non-tax advantages
over the subchapter S corporation, see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.01, at 28
(West Supp. 1993) (Preface and Overview Comments to Reporter's Notes).
When compared to a general partnership, the LLC's most obvious benefit
is limited liability. Partners of a general partnership are jointly and severally
liable not only for the debts and other monetary obligations of the partner-
ship, but in addition for damages caused by partner malfeasance or misfea-
sance in the course of partnership business resulting in injury to the person or
property of another. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 323.12 (1992) (partnership liable
for partner's wrongful act); 323.13 (partnership liable for partner's breach of
trust); 323.14 (nature of partner's liability).
Limited partnerships also pale in comparison to limited liability compa-
nies. At least one of the partners in a limited partnership is a general partner,
and as such is personally liable for partnership debts. Moreover, limited part-
ners who participate in partnership management risk liability exposure akin
to that of a general partner. The Act shields members of the LLC from liabil-
ity while providing for unlimited member participation in management.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.01, at 28-29 (West Supp. 1993) (Preface and Overview
Comments to Reporter's Notes).
8. See MINN. STAT. § 322B.80 (Supp. 1993). The law generally disfavors
clauses purporting to modify or destroy debtors' rights on filing of bankruptcy.
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (1988) (invalidating contractual clauses and non-bank-
ruptcy laws modifying or terminating a debtor's rights on bankruptcy). The
ill-light cast upon such provisions originates in the general policies of bank-
ruptcy. Briefly, allowing the nori-bankrupt party to the contract a unilateral
termination power prejudices other creditors, whose main interest is max-
imization of the pool of assets available for distribution. The debtor is also
damaged because the other party's continued contractual performance may be
critical to the debtor's continued economic viability, especially where a partic-
ular contract contains terms favoring the debtor.
9. See generally Lawrence J. La Sala, Note, Partner Bankruptcy and
1993]
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existence of mutual duties and obligations between partners at
the time of filing for bankruptcy which, if unperformed by
either party, would constitute a material breach of the partner-
ship agreement.10 The Act imposes on LLC members, and the
LLC as an entity, mutual duties and obligations similar to those
of partners. Therefore, LLC agreements are in most cases ex-
ecutory contracts.
Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code (Code) empowers the
trustee'1 or debtor-in-possession' 2 (DIP)13 to assume or reject
an executory contract within sixty days of a debtor's petition
for relief.14 The Code safeguards this power of assumption by
invalidating contractual clauses or non-bankruptcy laws which
purport to eliminate or modify a debtor's contractual rights on
bankruptcy.15 The Code, however, carves out exceptions to the
general rule of assumability where applicable state law pre-
cludes non-consensual substitute performance. 16
Authorities divide on the assumability of a bankrupt part-
ner's partnership interests. One line of cases invalidates ipso
Partnership Dissolution: Protecting the Terms of the Contract and Ensuring
Predictability, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 619, 626 n.36 (compiling cases and analyz-
ing decisions treating partnership agreements as executory contracts).
10. Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57
MINN. L. REV. 439, 460-62 (1973).
11. The trustee in bankruptcy functions as the estate representative. 11
U.S.C. § 323(a) (1988). The Code empowers the trustee to take possession of
all property of the estate, defending and protecting the estate's interests in
such property, and retaining and, where appropriate, enhancing the value of
estate property. See IRVING SuILMEYER ET AL., 1991 COLLIER HANDBOOK FOR
TRUSTEES AND DEBTORS IN POSSESSION 4.03 (5th ed.).
The trustee serves as a fiduciary to creditors and the debtor by maximiz-
ing the estate's pool of assets. He objects to inappropriate and unfounded
claims against the estate, shields exempt property, and protects any surplus
proceeds from sales of estate property. See id. 4.02.
12. A Chapter 11 debtor automatically becomes the "debtor in possession"
on commencement of the case, unless the debtor does not qualify to act as
trustee. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(1), 321(a)(2) (1988). Under § 321(a)(2), the
debtor corporation's charter or bylaws must authorize the debtor to assume
the role of debtor in possession.
The Code charges the debtor in possession with all of the duties of a
trustee operating the business in Chapter 11. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988). Con-
sequently, the debtor in possession maintains estate assets and runs the busi-
ness for the benefit of creditors and equity holders. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1)-
(7)(1988); SULMEYER, supra note 11, 1 20.05(1).
13. To avoid needless duplicity, this Note uses the term "trustee" to sig-
nify both the trustee and DIP, unless the context specifically calls for use of
the term DIP.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (1988).
15. See id. § 365(e)(1).
16. See id. §§ 365(c), (e)(2).
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facto or bankruptcy termination clauses in a partnership agree-
ment. An ipso facto clause forces partnership dissolution and
terminates a bankrupt partner's management interest in the
partnership on such partner's filing for bankruptcy. The cases
hold that ipso facto clauses are inconsistent with overriding
federal bankruptcy law, thereby preventing partnership disso-
lution and permitting assumption of the debtor's entire interest
in the partnership.
Another line of cases examines the exceptions to executory
contract assumability and concludes that applicable non-bank-
ruptcy law excuses the non-bankrupt partners from substitute
performance. Courts following this line of reasoning uphold
partnership dissolution and divestiture of the bankrupt part-
ner's management interest.
The Act embraces the UPA's ipso facto provisions, dissolv-
ing the LLC and dispossessing the bankrupt member's govern-
ance rights on filing for bankruptcy.17 The critical question
thus is whether bankruptcy tribunals should allow the trustee
to assume the LLC agreement. The question requires a careful
weighing of competing interests.
The non-bankrupt members may have a compelling pecuni-
ary stake in continuing the business, and a strong desire to be
free from unwanted interference with company operations.
Under the Act, the non-bankrupt LLC members can carry on
the business in the event of a member's bankruptcy if there are
two or more remaining members and all such members consent
to continuation.' 8 Allowing assumption of the LLC agreement
would enable the trustee or DIP to exercise a member's ever
present right to terminate the LLC, or to tread on the manage-
ment prerogative of the non-bankrupt members.
In contrast, the estate has a strong interest in assuming the
LLC agreement. The primary goal of the bankruptcy estate is
to maximize assets of the estate, fostering the debtor's fresh
start and optimizing compensation of creditors. Assumption
and retention of the bankrupt's governance interest would per-
mit the trustee to assume the LLC agreement and to interpose
himself in the shoes of the debtor and actively participate in en-
terprise management.
This Note considers whether the Code authorizes assump-
tion of a bankrupt member's interest in the LLC. Part I in-
troduces Act provisions relevant to the bankruptcy context and
17. MINN. STAT. § 322B.80 (Supp. 1993).
18. Id-
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compares them to UPA provisions. Part II establishes the
bankruptcy framework, describes the powers of the bankruptcy
trustee, and discusses section 365 of the Code. Part III exam-
ines case law on partnership agreements in the executory con-
tract context, discussing cases invalidating ipso facto clauses,
and cases reaching the exceptions., Finally, Part IV prescribes a
methodology for examining LLC agreements as "executory
contracts," suggesting that courts should defer to the statutory
scheme for member bankruptcy embodied in the new Minne-
sota Limited Liability Company Act. The note concludes that
courts should not allow the trustee to assume the LLC
agreement.
I. ACT PROVISIONS ENGENDERING PROBLEMS IN
BANKRUPTCY
The Act's drafters sought to maximize tax advantage while
minimizing member exposure to liability. Therefore, the draft-
ers adopted certain partnership attributes to avoid corporate
taxation. The Act further imposes mutual duties and obliga-
tions on LLC members analogous to those of general partners.
These attributes, duties, and obligations reveal that in the
bankruptcy context, the LLC closely resembles a partnership.
A. AVOIDING CORPORATE TAXATION: LIMITED LIFE SPAN
AND BIFURCATION OF INTERESTS
To qualify for partnership taxation, the LLC must possess
no more than two of the following "corporate" attributes19 :
limited liability,20  centralized management, 21  continuity of
19. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 392. The rationale for the "two-out-of-
four" limitation stems from the Supreme Court's decision in Morrisey v. Com-
missioner, which identified the crucial components of "corporateness" for pur-
poses of determining an entity's entitlement to partnership taxation. 296 U.S.
344, 356-59 (1935). The United States Treasury Department will not classify
an entity as an association and impose corporate income taxes unless the en-
tity's corporate characteristics outnumber its noncorporate characteristics.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1977). See also Gazur & Goff,
supra note 4, at 440-41.
20. The treasury regulations provide in part that an organization has lim-
ited liability "if under local law there is no member who is personally liable
for the debts of or claims against the organization." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
(2)(d)(1) (as amended in 1977) (emphasis added). Personal liability means that
creditors of the organization may seek satisfaction for claims or debts from in-
dividual members of the organization to the extent the organization's assets
fail to satisfy the claim. Id.
21. Management is centralized where an individual or group of individuals
possess authority to make decisions with regard to the day-to-day business op-
[Vol. 77:953
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life,2 2 or free transferability of interest.23 Recognizing that lim-
ited liability is important and that centralized management is
an attractive mechanism for owner participation in small busi-
nesses, the Act's drafters focused on excising continuity of life
and free transferability of interest.24
The Act bestows partnership tax classification on the LLC
through two devices. One such device limits LLC continuity.
The Act restricts the life-span of the LLC to thirty years25 and
adopts partnership dissolution events.26 The occurrence of any
of a number of statutorily specified events, including the bank-
ruptcy of any member, dissolves the company.21 Like a part-
nership, the company ceases to exist legally after winding up.28
In the event of bankruptcy dissolution, however, the LLC may
continue operations if two or more members remain and unani-
mously consent within ninety days of case commencement to
carry on the company.29
The Act also limits the transferability of member interests
by stratifying such interests into financial3 0 and governance 3 '
erations of the organization without receiving ratification from the organiza-
tion's constituent members. Id. § 301.7701-2(c)(1)-(3).
22. Generally, an organization has continuity of life when "the death, in-
sanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member will
not cause a dissolution of the organization." Id- § 301.7701-2(b)(1).
23. An organization's interests are freely transferrable if members are
free to alienate interests so as to substitute another in their stead without the
consent of other members. See ad § 301.7701-2(e)(1).
24. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.01, at 25-26 (West Supp. 1993) (Preface and
Overview Comments to Reporter's Notes).
25. See MINN. STAT. § 322B.115(1)(4) (Supp. 1993).
26. See MINN. STAT. § 322B.80 (Supp. 1993) In adopting the dissolution
events of a partnership, the Act's drafters were no doubt mindful of the provi-
sions of Treasury Regulations § 301.7701-2(b)(1). The regulation states that "if
the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any
member will cause a dissolution of the organization, continuity of life does not
exist."
27. MINN. STAT. § 322B.80 (Supp. 1993). Bankruptcy terminates "the con-
tinued membership of a member of the limited liability company." Id Recall
also that bankruptcy is one of the litany of events under the Treasury Regula-
tions which, if it causes dissolution, defeats an organization's continuity of life.
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1977).
28. See MINN. STAT. §§ 322B.80, .813 (Supp. 1993). In this sense, the LLC
differs significantly from a corporation. Corporate dissolution legally termi-
nates business operations. Dissolution of the LLC, like the dissolution of a
partnership, merely constitutes "the beginning of the end followed by a period
of winding up and eventual termination." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.01, at 27
(West Supp. 1993) (Preface and Overview Comments to Reporter's Notes).
29. MINN. STAT. § 322B.80(1) (Supp. 1993).
30. A member's "financial rights" are the rights to share in profits and
1993]
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rights.32 An assignee of a membership takes only a financial in-
terest in the LLC, unless all of the other LLC members con-
sent to assignation of the accompanying governance interest.33
In bankruptcy, the Act correspondingly limits non-consensual
assignment. Thus, if on a member's bankruptcy the LLC
avoids dissolution through consent,3 the bankrupt member
(and therefore the bankruptcy estate) forfeits all governance
rights.-s The bankrupt retains only his economic rights as an
assignee of his share of profits and surplus.
36
B. COMPARISON WITH THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
The Act draws extensively from the Uniform Partnership
Act (UPA) in defining the nature of a member's interest in the
LLC and in prescribing the mechanisms of dissolution and
winding up. Under the UPA, a partner holds three types of in-
surplus, and to receive interim, regular, and termination distributions. MINN.
STAT. § 322B.03(19)(i)-(4) (Supp. 1993).
31. "Governance rights" encompass all of a member's non-financial rights,
excluding the right to assign financial rights. Id. § 322B.03(22).
32. The bifurcation of financial and governance rights flows from the lan-
guage of Treasury Regulations § 301.7701-2(e)(1), which provides in part:
Mhe [corporate] characteristic of free transferability of interests does
not exist in a case in which each member can, without the consent of
other members, assign only his right to share in profits but cannot so
assign his rights to participate in the management of the organization.
The Act's drafters suggest that in most instances, these restraints on aliena-
tion will have little or no effect. Alluding to subchapter S corporations, they
point out that such restrictions frequently arise at the insistence of the share-
holders. The purpose of such restraints in the S corporation context is to con-
fer upon shareholders the power to exclude persons unacceptable to existing
shareholders. Because memberships in the LLC, like shares of an S corpora-
tion, are not traded publicly, the drafters sought to maintain in the owners the
power to select their business associates. More significantly, the drafters
sought to minimize the impact of eliminating corporate attributes. In the
weighing process, they deemed centralized management and limited liability
the more important interests. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.01, at 26 (West Supp.
1993) (Preface and Overview Comments to Reporter's Notes).
33. See MINN. STAT. § 322B.313(2) (Supp. 1993). The treasury regulations,
however, render minuscule the likelihood of the LLC lifting restraints on the
alienation of governance interests, since free transferability of such interests
destroys the LLC's partnership status for tax purposes. See Treas. Reg.
301.7701-2(e)(1) (as amended in 1977).
34. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
35. Minnesota Statutes § 322B.306(3)(1) (1993) provides in part that "if
dissolution under section 322B.80, subdivision 1, clause (5) [which includes a
member's bankruptcy], is avoided through dissolution avoidance consent, then
the member whose membership has terminated loses all governance rights
and will be considered merely an assignee of the financial rights owned before
the termination of membership."
36. Id
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terests:37 an economic interest,38 a management interest,3 9 and
an interest in partnership property.40 A partner's conveyance
of his partnership interest does not cause dissolution,41 but the
assignee, like the assignee of a membership interest in the
LLC,42 has no right to interfere in partnership management.43
Moreover, a partner's bankruptcy, like a member's bankruptcy
under the Act, dissolves the partnership,44 terminating the
partner's authority to act on behalf of the partnership.45
LLC members and partners possess duties and obligations
to the other individuals in their respective organizations, some
arising from status, and some from the mere fact of member-
ship in an aggregation.46 Thus, in recognition of a general part-
ner's broad powers to conduct transactions on behalf of the
partnership,47 the law imposes fiduciary obligations, including a
37. Minnesota Statutes § 323.23 (1992) provides: "The property rights of a
partner are rights in specific partnership property, an interest in the partner-
ship, and the right to participate in the management."
38. The partner's economic interest in the partnership includes his share
of profits and partnership surplus. This interest is in the nature of personal
property. MiNN. STAT. § 323.25 (1992).
39. See MiNN. STAT. § 323.23 (1992).
40. The partner holds partnership property with other partners as a "ten-
ant in partnership." Incidents of the tenancy include the right to possess part-
nership property in furtherance of partnership purposes, MINN. STAT.
§ 323.24(1) (1992), but the partner may not use the property in furtherance of
personal aims, nor assign the property without assigning each of the partner's
interests concomitantly. Id
41. MINN. STAT. § 323.26 (1992).
42. See MINN. STAT. § 322B.313(2) (Supp. 1993).
43. MINN. STAT. § 323.26 (1992).
44. MNN. STAT. § 323.30(d)(5) (1992).
45. See MINN. STAT. § 323.32 (1992).
46. See Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company, A
Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375, 401 (1992) (noting that while
early versions of the LLC do not specify the fiduciary obligations of members
or managers because of their adoption of several limited partnership attrib-
utes, "[t]he rule for LLCs probably will evolve toward general partnership
type duties for members in member-managed LLCs, and toward corporate di-
rector type duties for managers in manager-managed LLCs")
47. With respect to a partner's power to bind the partnership, the UPA
provides in part:
Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its
business, and the act of every partner... for apparently carrying on
in the usual way the business of the partnership binds the partner-
ship, unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for
the partnership in the particular matter, and the person with whom
the partner is dealing has knowledge of the fact that partner has no
such authority.
MmN. STAT. § 323.08 (1992).
19931
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duty of loyalty48 and fair dealing.49 Similarly, vested with au-
thority to dispose of LLC property and bind constituents in
dealings with third parties, a member serving as a manager or
governor (officer) of the LLC must discharge positional duties
in "good faith" and in a manner consistent with the "best inter-
ests" of the LLC.50
Other duties place restraints on partners, member-officers
and non-officer members alike. These duties implicitly recog-
nize the aggregate welfare of the enterprise as superior to an
individual's interest. Consequently, both the Act and the UPA
prohibit retirement or resignation in contravention of the arti-
cles of organization5 ' or partnership agreement.5 2 Both stat-
utes also enjoin non-consensual assignment of management
interests.53 Partners' duties under the UPA are more stringent
and specific, but both statutes impose ongoing fiduciary
obligations.
Both statutes also create duties flowing from the aggregate
enterprise to the individual.- Thus, like a partnership,55 the
LLC must comply with the LLC agreement when making dis-
48. In the words of then-Chief Justice Cardozo, partners "owe to one an-
other, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many
forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.... Not honesty alone,
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behav-
ior." Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
49. For instance, a partner must "render, on demand, true and full infor-
mation of all things affecting the partnerships [sic]." MINN. STAT. § 323.19
(1992). A partner must also account for any profit or benefit derived in con-
nection -with partnership business. MINN. STAT. § 323.20 (1992).
50. Minnesota Statutes § 322B.663(1) (Supp. 1993) provides: A governor
shall discharge the duties of the position of governor in good faith, in a man-
ner the governor reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the limited
liability company, and with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like po-
sition would exercise under similar circumstances. See also MINN. STAT.
§ 322B.69 (Supp. 1993) (same for managers).
51. See MINN. STAT. § 322B.306(4) (Supp. 1993) (imposing liability for
damages to the LLC on the event of a member's wrongful resignation or re-
tirement, and further providing the company a remedy to exclude that mem-
ber's interest in the LLC's good will).
52. See MINN. STAT. § 323.30(d) (1992) (partner acts wrongfully by causing
dissolution in contravention of partnership agreement).
53. See MINN. STAT. §§ 322B.313(2) (Supp. 1993) (assignment of member's
interest); MINN. STAT. 323.26 (1992) (assignment of partner's interest).
54. See MINN. STAT. § 323.17 (1992) (partner's rights to recover certain ex-
penditures and contributions and to participate equally in partnership manage-
ment); MINN. STAT. 323.21 (1992) (partner's right to receive an accounting).
55. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 323.17 (1992), which provides in part:
The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership
[Vol. 77:953
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
tributions or allocating profits,5 and render an accounting to
any member on reasonable demand.5 7
Given the similarity of partnership and membership inter-
ests, the existence of mutual duties and obligations in both con-
texts, and the identical consequences of an individual's
bankruptcy on the remaining partners and members, courts
considering parties' rights on a member's bankruptcy should
follow the course chartered in partner bankruptcy cases.
II. RECOVERY OF ESTATE PROPERTY: POWERS OF
THE BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE OR DEBTOR IN
POSSESSION
General bankruptcy law presumes that the trustee "stands
in the shoes of the debtor" and assumes all of the debtor's
rights with respect to property of the estate.58 The Code de-
fines property of the estate to include "all legal and equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of
the case." 59 Such property accedes to the estate "notwithstand-
ing any provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or ap-
shall be determined, subject to any agreement between them, by the
following rules:
(1) Each partner shall be repaid any contributions, whether by
way of capital or advances to the partnership property and share
equally in the profits and surplus remaining after all liabilities.
Functionally, the statute reads a right to share profits and distributions of
partnership property into the partnership agreement unless the partners spec-
ify otherwise. In any case, the partnership must comply with the express or
implied-in-law terms of the partnership agreement.
56. See MINN. STAT. § 322B.50 (Supp. 1993) (providing that distributions of
LLC cash or assets must be made in conformity with articles or action of
board of governors, or distributed proportionally according to member's own-
ership interest in the absence of such directives); MINN. STAT., § 322B.326
(Supp. 1993) (same for LLC profits); see also MINN. STAT. § 323.17(1) (1992)
(giving partner a right to share equally in partnership profits unless partner-
ship agreement otherwise provides, in which case partner shares per terms of
agreement).
57. See MINN. STAT. § 322B.376 (Supp. 1993) (Providing for an accounting
upon demand for LLC member); MINN. STAT. § 323.21 (1992) (same for part-
ner). In the case of the LLC, due process further requires strict company
compliance regarding meetings, see MINN. STAT. §§ 322B.33, .36 (Supp. 1993);
notice of meetings, see MINN. STAT. § 322B.34 (Supp. 1993); and voting at meet-
ings. MINN. STAT. §§ 322B.353-.37 (Supp. 1993).
58. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988) ('"The trustee shall have, as of the com-
mencement of the case, and without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or
of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may avoid any transfer of prop-
erty of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable
5. 11US8)59. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
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plicable nonbankruptcy law." °
The trustee holds a duty to maximize the assets of the
bankruptcy estate.6 1  To facilitate estate maximization, the
Code gives the trustee broad powers to avoid transfers of prop-
erty of the estate.62 Closely related to these avoidance powers
is the trustee's power to assume or reject executory contracts.
A. THE MEANING OF "EXECUTORY CONTRACT"
Executory contracts are those "under which the obligations
of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so
unperformed 63 that the failure of either to complete perform-
ance would constitute a material breach1 excusing the per-
formance of the other." The appropriate time for measuring
60. Id- § 541(c)(2).
61. See 11 U.S.C. § 704(1) (1988) (requiring the trustee to "collect and re-
duce to money the property of the estate ... as is compatible with the best
interests of parties in interest").
62. For a comprehensive explanation of the bankruptcy trustee's avoid-
ance powers, see GEORGE M. TREISTER Er AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BANK-
RUPTCY LAw 137-91 (2d ed. 1988).
63. The meaning of performance, though generally assumed in the litera-
ture and case law, becomes critical to defining whether a contract is executory.
Generally, "performance" is "The fulfillment or accomplishment of a promise,
contract, or other obligation according to its terms." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARtY 1137 (6th ed. 1990). Within the contemplation of this definition, there are
two types of performance under a contract, positive and negative. Thus, to
"perform" may consist of "action on the part of the person bound by the con-
tract [positive performance] or in omission to act [negative performance], ac-
cording to the nature of the subject matter." Id. (emphasis added); cf. In re
Fryar, 99 B.R. 747, 750 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (finding debtor had not fully
performed contract, in part, because debtor "had a duty not to plant crops" on
certain land).
64. The Second Restatement of Contracts provides guidelines for deter-
mining when failure to perform rises to the level of material breach:
In determining whether a failure to render or to offer performance is
material, the following circumstances are significant:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the ben-
efit which he reasonably expected;
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compen-
sated for the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived;
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to per-
form will suffer forfeiture;
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to per-
form will cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances
including any reasonable assurances;
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or
to offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair
dealing.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1981).
65. Countryman, supra note 10, at 460. Professor Vern Countryman, in
his seminal article Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, proffered the defini-
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whether a contract is executory is at the time of filing for bank-
ruptcy.r To date, bankruptcy courts have uniformly treated
partnership agreements as executory contracts.6 7 The execu-
tory contract designation brings partnership agreements in
bankruptcy under the auspices of Code section 365.
tion of executory contract now employed by a majority of United States Bank-
ruptcy Courts and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Speck v. First
Nat'l Bank of Sioux Falls (In re Speck), 798 F.2d 279, 279-80 (8th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam).
Presently, a debate rages among courts and scholars about the continuing
vitality of the Countryman test. Several other definitions of "executory con-
tract" currently clutter the cases. One school draws on the legislative history
of § 365. Both the Senate and House reports state: "Though there is no pre-
case definition of what contracts are executory, it generally includes contracts
on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides." H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
58 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N., 5787, 5844, 6303. This definition dif-
fers from the Countryman definition in that it eliminates the "material
breach" requirement. Cf In re Rovine Corp., 6 B.R. 661, 664 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. 1980) (suggesting that a contract is executory when, at the time of filing
for bankruptcy protection, both parties have an obligation to perform).
Another formulation of the definition holds a contract executory where
there exists merely a "contingent obligation," such as an obligation of a patent
licensor to bring suit on behalf of a licensee against third party infringement.
See Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers (In re Richmond Metal Fin-
ishers), 756 F.2d 1043, 1046 (4th Cir. 1985).
A third definition takes a functional approach to what constitutes an exec-
utory contract, looking to Code policies and the efficacy of finding an execu-
tory contract with respect to the parties in interest. See generally La Sala,
supra note 9, at 624-25 n.30 (compiling cases and discussing the various defini-
tions of "executory contract").
66. See ELIzABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORs
AND CREDrroRs 573 (1989).
67. While one court has rejected finding partnership agreements execu-
tory per se, see, e.g., In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 972-73 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1990) (trustee conceded partnership agreement was an executory
contract, but court, in absence of circuit precedent on subject, refused to rule
on whether an executory contract existed), finding an executory contract is
normally a matter of course. See, e.g., Vindicator Group, Inc. v. Lavail (In re
Lavail), 144 B.R. 897, 898 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1992); In re Corky Foods Corp., 85
B.R. 903, 904 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988); In re Harms, 10 B.R. 817, 820 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1981).
The factors giving rise to "executoriness" depend on the contents of the
partnership agreement. The few courts venturing to discuss the issue typically
elaborate a list of the mutual obligations existing at the time of filing to
demonstrate the agreement's executory nature. In re Harms, 10 B.R. at 821
(applying legislative history definition of "executory" and finding that "[tihe
general partner has a multitude of services to perform and the limited part-
ners are obligated to make substantial future payments").
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B. SECTION 365: RULEs FOR ASSUMING EXECUTORY
CONTRACTS
1. The General Rule
Section 365(a) of the Code states the general rule for a
debtor's executory contracts. The trustee, with court approval,
may "assume or reject any contract ... of the debtor. s68 The
alternatives "assume or reject" envision an economically expe-
dient election, allowing the trustee to assume beneficial and re-
ject detrimental contracts.69 The trustee retains this power "to
relieve the estate from burdensome obligations while the
debtor is trying to recover financially." 70  The trustee is con-
strained, however, to assume or reject the entire contract.71
Augmenting the broad power of executory contract as-
sumption is section 365(e)(1), which invalidates certain ipso
facto clauses and non-bankruptcy laws that operate to destroy a
debtor's rights based solely on the debtor's petition for bank-
ruptcy relief.7 2 Together, these Code provisions foster the pri-
mary purpose of maximizing the pool of assets at the estate's
disposal.73
Once assumed, the executory contract inures to the benefit
of the estate, which is free to exercise any and all of the
debtor's contractual rights, including the right to assign the
68. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988).
69. See Jay L. Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts,
74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 231 (1989) ("The trustee is given broad discretion to as-
sume or reject, whichever course will maximize the value of the bankruptcy
estate and minimize claims against it.") (footnote omitted); see also supra
notes 11-12, 61 (discussing fiduciary duties of the trustee and debtor in
possession).
70. Vindicator Group, Inc. v. Lavail (In re Lavail), 144 B.R. 897, 898
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1992). See also In re Register, 95 B.R. 73 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1989).
71. See In re Rovine Corp., 6 B.R. 661 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980) (holding
that trustee's rejection of a franchise agreement with Burger King caused re-
jection of the whole contract, including a covenant executed by the debtor
agreeing not to compete with Burger King during the duration of the
franchise agreement and for several years thereafter).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1988). This section provides:
Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract ... or in appli-
cable law, an executory contract ... of the debtor may not be termi-
nated or modified, and any right or obligation under such contract...
may not be terminated or modified, at any time after the commence-
ment of the case solely because of a provision in such contract... that
is conditioned on-
... (B) the commencement of a case under this title ....
73. See supra notes 11-12, 61 and accompanying text.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
contract.74 Congress, however, expressly recognized that exer-
cise of the debtor's contract rights may in some circumstances
severely infringe the rights of other parties to the contract.75
Thus, the Code circumscribes narrow situations in which an ex-
ecutory contract falls beyond the estate's reach.
2. Exceptions to the General Rule
A primary exception to section 365(a) eradicates the
trustee's power to assume a personal services executory con-
tract where state law excuses the non-bankrupt party from ac-
cepting non-consensual substitute performance.76 Consistent
with the legislative history of section 365(c), bankruptcy courts
read this exception to prohibit assumption of personal services
contracts, contracts which necessarily contemplate performance
by a specific party,77 unless performance is to continue in the
debtor or DIP.78
Section 365(e)(2) further constrains assumption of personal
services contracts by giving effect to a contract's ipso facto pro-
visions.79 Functionally, the contract by its own terms ceases ef-
74. See Westbrook, supra note 69, at 231.
75. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(c), (e)(2)(B) (1988).
76. See id § 365(c). This section provides in part:
The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract ... of
the debtor, whether or not such contract... prohibits or restricts as-
signment of rights or delegation of duties, if- (1)(A) applicable law
excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract... from ac-
cepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity
other than the debtor or the debtor in possession whether or not such
contract... prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of
duties; and (B) such party does not consent to such assumption or as-
signment ....
77. See infra Part MI.B.
78. See Leasehold Management Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1983,
Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 361 (1984). In 1984, Congress amended Code
§ 365(c) relating to the assumption of personal service executory contracts.
The amendment placed the DIP in the shoes of the debtor, thus precluding
the trustee from assuming a personal service contract where applicable law
excuses a non-debtor from accepting performance from an entity "other than
the debtor or the debtor in possession." 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) (1988). The
amendment plainly indicates that if the debtor or DIP continue performance,
the contract is assumable. See In re Fryar, 99 B.R. 747, 750 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1989) (examining the effects of the amendment).
79. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2) (1988). This section provides in part:
Paragraph (1) [invalidating ipso facto provisions] of this subsection
does not apply to an executory contract ... of the debtor, whether or
not such contract.., prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or del-
egation of duties, if-
(A)(i) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such
contract... from accepting performance from or rendering perform-
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fect between the parties at case commencement.8 0
III. PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS AS EXECUTORY
CONTRACTS
Partner bankruptcy cases stratify along two distinct lines.
Some cases conclude that partnership agreements harboring
ipso facto clauses, though authorized by a state's version of the
UPA, are invalid.8 1 These cases hold that the Supremacy
Clause,8 2 overriding bankruptcy policies, and the plain language
of Code Section 365(e)(1) preclude enforcement of ipso facto
clauses. The effect is that the partnership does not dissolve,
the debtor partner retains all pre-bankruptcy interests, and the
estate is free to assume the partnership agreement.
Other cases overcome the hurdle of ipso facto provisions
and consider the applicability of the exceptions to the right of
assumption or rejection. Generally, these cases hold that part-
nership agreements are non-assumable personal services con-
tracts under applicable state law.8 3  The trustee is thus
precluded from assuming the contract and takes as a mere as-
signee of the bankrupt's economic rights pursuant to the
UPA.8 4
ance to the trustee or to an assignee of such contract. . ., whether or
not such contract... prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or del-
egation of duties; and
(ii) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment
80. I&
81. See In re Hawkins, 113 B.R. 315, 316 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990) (holding
UPA provision mandating dissolution on the bankruptcy of a partner inconsis-
tent with and preempted by 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1)(B)); In re Corky Foods, 85
B.R. 903, 904 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (same); In re BC & K Cattle Co., 84 B.R.
69, 71 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (same); In re Safren, 65 B.R. 566, 569 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1986) (same); In re Rittenhouse Carpet, Inc., 56 B.R. 131, 133
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (same).
82. Article I, § 8, clause 4 of the Constitution, empowers Congress to pro-
mulgate laws relating to bankruptcy. Laws promulgated by the Congress
under the cloak of constitutional authority are the "supreme Law of the
Land," see U.S. CONST. art. VI, and preempt state law to the contrary. Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1824).
83. See In re Sunset Developers, 69 B.R. 710 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1987); In re
Minton Group, Inc., 27 B.R. 710 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd 46 B.R. 222
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Harms, 10 B.R. 817 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981). These cases
implicitly recognize that partnership agreements are personal services con-
tracts because the fiduciary duties of good faith and fair dealing to other part-
ners under the contract are non-delegable. See La Sala, supra note 9, at 629 &
nn.60-66.
84. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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A. REJECTION AT THE THRESHOLD: CASES HOLDING IPSO
FACTO CLAUSES INVALID
Most states, like Minnesota, have adopted the UPA and the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA).a5 These statutes
contain ipso facto provisions calling for dissolution of the part-
nership "by the bankruptcy of any partner. '86 Thus, one line
of cases has explored whether an ipso facto clause effectively
dissolves a partnership.8 7
Several cases hold that section 365(e)(1) overrides state law
and partnership agreements which dissolve the partnership on
a partner's bankruptcy.8 Courts have applied this principle to
cases arising in the context of business reorganization bank-
ruptcies under Chapter 11 and liquidation bankruptcies under
Chapter 7.
1. The Chapter 11 Context
Chapter 11 debtors are most frequently corporations.8 9
The executory contract issue arises in the context of a corpo-
rate-DIP attempting to assume a partnership agreement writ-
ten under the UPA.
One rationale for denying effect to ipso facto dissolution in
Chapter 11 pivots on interpretation of the UPA's legislative his-
85. MINN. STAT. §§ 323.01-.43 (1992) (Uniform Partnership Act); MINN.
STAT. §§ 322A.01-.87 (1992) (Uniform Limited Partnership Act).
86. See MINN. STAT. § 323.30(d)(5) (1992). Note that the Minnesota ULPA
does not provide for dissolution of a limited partnership on the bankruptcy of
a partner unless the partnership agreement specifies dissolution as such. See
MINN. STAT. § 322A.63(2) (1992). Lininted partnerships nevertheless retain
their partnership tax classification because the ULPA makes the general part-
ner personally liable for claims in excess of the assets of the enterprise. See
supra note 21-36 and accompanying text.
87. See In re Hawkins, 113 B.R. 315, 316 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990) (holding
UPA ipso facto provision inconsistent with 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1)(B)); In re
Corky Foods, 85 B.R. 903, 904 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (same); In re BC & K
Cattle Co., 84 B.R. 69 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (same); In re Safren, 65 B.R.
566, 569 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (same); In re Rittenhouse Carpet, Inc., 56 B.R.
131, 133 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (same). But see In re Sunset Developers, 69
B.R. 710 (finding that filing terminates partner's interest and causes partner-
ship dissolution); In re Minton Group, Inc., 27 B.R. 710 (same); In re Harms, 10
B.R. 817 (same).
88. See supra note 87 and cases cited therein.
89. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 66, at 427. Professors Warren
and Westbrook assert that although individuals are eligible for Chapter 11 re-
lief, Chapter 13 is better suited for most individuals. Chapter 13 affords the
debtor much broader discharge provisions than Chapter 11. Thus individuals
in Chapter 11 are typically persons with extraordinarily large debt loads who
exceed the statutory maximum for filing under Chapter 13. Id-
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tory. The court in In re Hawkins90 examined whether a part-
ner's petition for relief under Chapter 11 caused dissolution of
the partnership.91 Both the partnership agreement in question
and Texas's version of the UPA contained bankruptcy termina-
tion clauses.9 2
The court used imaginative reconstruction to determine
the UPA drafters' intent.93 The UPA was promulgated in
1914,94 and at the time of its enactment, liquidation constituted
the sole form of bankruptcy relief.95 Congress did not author-
ize business reorganization bankruptcies until twenty years
later.96 Therefore, the UPA's drafters could not have intended
that the filing of a Chapter 11 case trigger dissolution.9 7 The
court denied a partner's motion to lift the automatic stay and
terminate the partnership.9
2. The Plain Meaning of Section 365(e)(1) and the Supremacy
Clause
Other cases refusing dissolution because of the existence of
an ipso facto provision in both the Chapter 7 and Chapter 11
contexts have rested on the plain meaning of Code section
90. 113 B.R. 315 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
91. Id- at 316.
92. IM
93. Imaginative reconstruction directs judges to act as faithful agents of
the enacting legislature. Where legislative intent is not altogether clear,
"judges should put themselves in the minds of the enacting legislature and im-
aginatively reconstruct what the legislature would have done had it considered
and resolved the issue." Phillip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat:
The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MIMN. L. REV. 241, 251-
52 (1992) (citing Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Class-
room and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHi. L. REv. 800, 817-20 (1983)). While the
court in Hawkins made no explicit mention of this technique, it used the
method by concluding that the drafters could not have anticipated Chapter 11
bankruptcy which was not in existence at the time the UPA was enacted.
Hawkins, 113 B.R. at 316.
94. Hawkins, 113 B.R. at 316.
95. Id
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing In re Safren, 65 B.R. 566, 569 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986)). The
court in Hawkins borrowed its analysis from In re Safren, 65 B.R. 566 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1986). There, the court held that the filing of a Chapter 11 petition
by a general partner did not dissolve the partnership, again holding the ipso
facto clause unenforceable on the basis of statutory construction and public
policy. Id. at 569-70. But see In re Phillips, 966 F.2d 926, 931 (5th Cir. 1992)
(disputing the Safren analysis and concluding that the relevant intent was not
the intent of the UPA's drafters, but rather the intent of the adopting
legislature).
98. Hawkins, 113 B.R. 315, 317 (1989).
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365(e)(1) and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. The
Code invalidates ipso facto clauses and state laws terminating a
debtor's interest on the basis of a bankruptcy filing.9 9 Under
the Supremacy Clause, federal law controls over conflicting
state laws."1' °
The result of these cases, regardless of the chapter under
which the debtor files for bankruptcy, is to allow the trustee to
assume the contract. The cases never address the policies af-
fecting the relational aspects of partnerships, which would com-
pel courts to look more closely at the exceptions to sections
365(a) and 365(e)(1).
B. PARTNERSIP AGREEMENTS AS PERSONAL SERVICE
CONTRACTS PROHIBiTNG SUBSTITUTE PERFORMANCE
By refusing to uphold bankruptcy termination clauses, the
preceding cases fail to consider two exceptions to the general
rule of assumability of executory contracts. Specifically, sec-
tion 365(c) suspends the trustee's power to assume or assign
personal services contracts where applicable law excuses a non-
debtor partner from accepting substituted performance."''
Similarly, section 365(e)(2) compels specific enforcement of
ipso facto clauses under identical circumstances."' 2
Courts applying the exceptions to assumability of execu-
tory contracts follow a common linear mode of decision. The
courts examine the interests and obligations flowing from the
partnership agreement. Normally, a partner has three types of
interests in the partnership: a management interest, a property
interest, and an economic interest.' 3 The analysis then shifts
to the effect on the non-bankrupt partners of allowing assump-
99. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1988).
100. The court in In re Rittenhouse Carpet, Inc., 56 B.R. 131 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1985) invoked the Supremacy Clause argument, in conjunction with the
plain language of Code § 365(e)(1) in similar fashion. There, the court ex-
amined whether filing for Chapter 11 relief caused dissolution of a partner-
ship, again in the face of partnership agreement and state law bankruptcy
termination provisions. Id- at 132. In conclusory fashion, the court dispensed
with the remaining partner's arguments, enunciating as its basis for decision
the fact that "the alleged elimination of the debtor from the partnership ...
[was] predicated solely on the filing of a petition under the Code, [and there-
fore] the purported ejection of the debtor was not effective because of § 365(e)
and the Supremacy Clause, and we held so several years ago." Id- at 133 (cita-
tions omitted).
101. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) (1988).
102. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2) (1988).
103. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
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tion of a given interest. Under the UPA, a partner's right to
share profits and surplus is personal property and therefore
property of the estate. 04 Discussion therefore centers on the
assumability of the debtor's contractual management rights. 0 5
Courts upholding dissolution and divestment of a partner's
management rights pursuant to the Code's exceptions advance
three rationales for preventing the trustee or DIP from assum-
ing the contract. 106 The first rationale is the "identity" ration-
ale.10 7 On principles similar to those disfavoring "involuntary
servitude,' 08 the identity rationale holds that the non-bank-
104. See MINN. STAT. § 323.25 (1992); see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988)
(providing that bankruptcy estate consists of "all legal or equitable interests of
the debtor in property as of commencement of the case"); In re Priestley, 93
B.R. 253, 257 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1988) ("A partner's interest in a partnership is
his share of the profits and surplus, and is personal property.... It is estate
property and the trustee may sell it.") (citations omitted).
105. See Priestly, 93 B.R. at 257.
106. See In re Manor Place Dev. Assocs., 144 B.R. 679, 683-87 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1992); In re Sovereign Group, 88 B.R. 325, 329 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988);
In re Sunset Developers, 69 B.R. 710, 711 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1987). See gener-
ally La Sala, supra note 9, at 637-43 (identifying and analyzing courts' ratio-
nales for refusing to allow the insolvent partner to retain a management
interest in the partnership).
107. The identity rationale originates in the language of the Code. Section
365(c) prohibits assumption or assignment of an executory contract when ap-
plicable law excuses a non-bankrupt party from accepting substitute perform-
ance. Section 365(e)(2) gives effect to ipso facto clauses in the same
circumstances. Section 365(c) is broader than its sister provision in the sense
that it includes as parties due performance the "debtor," while § 365(e)(2)
treats all persons other than the debtor as substitutes. Compare 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(c) (1988) with id § 365 (e)(2).
In re Harms, 10 B.R. 817 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981), examined the effect of
§ 365(c) in the context of a general partner's bankruptcy, where the non-bank-
rupt limited partners interposed an objection to accepting substitute perform-
ance from a new general partner. The court, upholding the limited partners'
objection, expressed the identity rationale in its most basic form, stating "[it is
obvious that the Trustee cannot assume the position of general partner of
these limited partnerships, since he is not the person with whom the limited
partnerships contracted." Id at 821.
108. Involuntary servitude is "[t]he condition of one who is compelled by
force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for another,
whether he is paid or not." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 828 (6th ed. 1990). Ar-
guably, framed in the context of a bankruptcy court ordering the non-bank-
rupt partners to incorporate into the partnership a trustee with whom they
have no previous business or personal contact, permitting assumption of the
bankrupt's management interest imposes involuntary servitude on the part-
nership. See In re Waldron, 36 B.R. 633, 641 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984); see also La
Sala, supra note 9, at 641 (suggesting that a requirement that non-consenting,
non-bankrupt partners carry on the business with a surrogate performer may
violate the Constitution's prohibition against involuntary servitude).
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rupt partners should not be thrust into the midst of an un-
wanted business association.
Accentuating and strengthening the identity rationale is
the "fiduciary" rationale.109 Partnerships resemble families,
often forged on a foundation of personal affinity and trust.10
Loyalty and demonstrated business acumen fuel the relation-
ship. Non-consensual substitution of a partner compromises
these foundational elements.
A final and closely related rationale is the "conflict of in-
terest" rationale. Allowing assumption of management inter-
ests places the trustee in the position of playing two roles, often
in diametric opposition."' The trustee is duty bound as repre-
sentative of the estate to observe the creditor's best interests. 1
A trustee as a general partner would owe to the other partners
a duty of loyalty and an obligation to manage partnership assets
109. Partners stand in a fiduciary role to co-partners. A partnership agree-
ment "is a contract based upon personal trust and confidence." Harms, 10
B.R. at 821; see also Manor Place, 144 B.R. at 682; Sovereign Group, 88 B.R. at
329; Sunset, 69 B.R. at 711; La Sala, supra note 9, at 637-38 (footnotes omitted)
("A partnership is among the most intimate of all business relationships. It is
an association for co-owners, formed by consent and imbued with fiduciary ob-
ligation. It is, in short, the business form most closely resembling a 'family' or
marriage.")
110. The court in Sovereign Group described a partnership agreement as
"unique in law because it is not only a legal relationship that is created but it
reflects a personal relation or status somewhat akin to the relationship of indi-
viduals in a marriage." 88 B.R. at 329. The UPA recognizes the fiduciary and
unique nature of a partnership by prohibiting an assignee of a partner's inter-
est from interfering in management of the enterprise. Manor Place, 144 B.R.
at 682.
111. See In re Phillips, 996 F.2d 926, 929 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Creditors are
wholly dependent upon the party controlling an estate in bankruptcy proceed-
ings to protect their interests. Likewise, partners ... must rely on general
partners to protect all partners' interests in partnership property. Both the
creditors and the partners are interested in the same partnership property.").
The fiduciary ties of the trustee and DIP to the debtor and creditors bol-
ster the premise of a serious conflict of interest. The trustee owes a duty to
the creditors to manage estate properties for the benefit of the creditors. The
trustee is bound to ensure fair protection of the debtor's interests by objecting
to unsubstantiated claims and, where appropriate, protecting exempt property
and the debtor's right to surplus estate property. The trustee or DIP in Chap-
ter 11 must assist the debtor in becoming a newly viable enterprise. Further
exacerbating the problem, the interests of the debtor and creditors often coin-
cide. To the extent the estate's assets are maximized, the debtor's prospects of
reorganization and the corresponding likelihood of completion of payments
under a plan increase. Estate maximization also fosters optimal compensation
to creditors in the event the debtor fails or liquidates. Therefore, the debtor,
out of pure self interest, may be just as unscrupulous in carrying on partner-
ship duties as a trustee. See SULMEYER ET AL., supra note 11, 4.02, 20.05(2).
112. See supra notes 17-18, 61 and accompanying text.
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accordingly.11 3 Obviously, such dual role playing threatens ne-
glect of one party's interests.
IV. A PRESCRIPTION FOR TREATMENT OF LLC
MEMBER BANKRUPTCY
The following prescribes a methodology for examining the
LLC member's bankruptcy. In most instances, LLC agree-
ments will be executory contracts. Courts must then examine
the validity of the Act's ipso facto clauses, whether the LLC
agreement fits within either of the exceptions to the general
rule of assumability of executory contracts, and whether the
policies of the exceptions apply in the context of the LLC
agreement. After undertaking such an examination, a court
should find that the LLC agreement is an executory personal
services contract and permit LLC dissolution but prohibit the
trustee's assumption of the debtor's governance interest.
A brief exploration of two alternative analytical methods
then ensues, primarily to establish the range of possible out-
comes and the gravity of the court's initial characterization of
the agreement.114 A court could find the LLC agreement is not
an executory contract. Consequently, the member-debtor's
legal and equitable rights would become property of the bank-
ruptcy estate notwithstanding an ipso facto clause in the LLC
agreement. Although the Act's provisions purport to transfer
the member-debtor's management interest, the Code empowers
the trustee to avoid such post-petition transfers.
Alternatively, a court could classify the LLC agreement as
an executory contract but invalidate the LLC's dissolution and
the transfer of a member's governance rights under section
365(e)(1). Under either set of circumstances, the trustee could
assume performance and exercise all of the debtor's rights
under the agreement. Neither course of action is particularly
satisfactory to the remaining members or beneficial to the LLC.
The alternative methods fail in each case, the first in fail-
ing to recognize that LLC agreements are executory contracts
and the second, although reaching the proper characterization,
in failing to recognize that LLC agreements fall within the per-
sonal services exception of section 365(e)(2) to the assumability
of executory contracts.
113. Phillips, 966 F.2d at 929-30.
114. The author is unaware of any case law addressing whether the trustee
can assume a member's governance interest in the LLC. The two proposed
alternative methods envision normal operation of normal bankruptcy rules.
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A. LLC AGREEMENTS ARE EXECUTORY CONTRACTS
The basic LLC agreement will be an executory contract for
all of its members. Typically, the LLC will be closely held.115
Each member will assume a management role"16 as well as du-
ties and obligations commensurate with managerial status.117
Members in the aggregate will owe one another compliance
with the LLC agreement." s8 Therefore, it is practical to assume
that ordinary LLC agreements are executory contracts.
As to governors and managers, the LLC agreement will al-
ways be executory. LLC officers operate the company, main-
tain a standard of conduct appropriate to the fiduciary nature
of those duties, and must act consistently with the terms of the
operating agreement.119 In consideration for those services, the
LLC makes distributions, allocates profits, and may provide ad-
ditional compensation. Failure of either side to perform per-
mits the other side to refuse further performance. 20
Whether the LLC agreement is executory as regards a non-
115. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.01, at 26 (West Supp. 1993) (Preface
and Overview Comments to Reporter's Notes). Several factors point to the
conclusion that LLCs will be closely held in most cases. First, because of Act
restrictions on transfers of membership interests, LLC interests may not be
publicly traded. For a large entity, such restrictions may severely restrain the
ability to raise capital. Second, the numerous dissolution events act as a bar-
rier to the formation of extraordinarily large LLCs, since the comparative de-
tachment of members in a large organization leads to uncertainty regarding
the willingness of other members to comply with the articles of organization
and operating agreement. Finally, the legislature specifically tailored the Act
to small businesses so that investors who heretofore may have been limited
partners could actively participate in enterprise management. See id (stating
that "the limited partnership model utilized by other states [as the basis of
their limited liability company statutes] was largely out of date and function-
ally unworkable for a small closely held business")
116. Along these lines, the absence of specific management duties in the
bankrupt should not preclude finding that the LLC agreement is an executory
contract. The significance of the members' duties, no matter how minuscule,
would appear to be inversely proportional to the number of members in the
company. In other words, a member's wrongful termination of the LLC in a
company comprised of 500 members and the corresponding problems of disso-
lution and possible winding up is potentially far more devastating than the im-
pact of wrongful dissolution on a five person enterprise.
117. See MINN. STAT. § 322B.663(1) (Supp. 1993).
118. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing MINN. STAT.
§ 322B.50 (Supp. 1993)).
119. See Keatinge, supra note 46, at 401 (suggesting that in member-man-
aged LLC's, members will likely be held to the more stringent fiduciary duties
of general partners).
120. Minnesota Statutes § 322B.636(2)(1) (Supp. 1993) provides that "A gov-
ernor may be removed at any time, with.., cause." See also MINN. STAT.
§ 322B.686(2) (Supp. 1993) (same for managers). As a consequence, if the gov-
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officer member raises a more difficult theoretical question.
Lacking a participative role in management, the non-officer
member may have little control over financial and property- re-
lated policy making. Because of the non-officer member's lim-
ited powers, the Act correspondingly limits this member's
duties.2 1
These limited duties, however, arguably give rise to execu-
tory obligations. The Act prohibits alienation of any member's
governance rights without all other members' unanimous con-
sent.32 2 The Act further proscribes wrongful withdrawal from
the company.m Compliance with these obligations, though
negative in nature, is a form of performance under the contract
which endures with the LLC agreement.124
The non-officer member's duties are material components
of performing the agreement.125 Indeed, the Act provides spe-
cific remedies for the unauthorized conveyance of a member's
governance interest and for wrongful withdrawal from the
LLC.12 6 The remedies excuse other members' continued per-
formance, in the first case destroying the non-consensual trans-
feror's management interest.127 Thus, the relationship of a
non-officer member to the company is executory.
Even casting aside the notion of "negative performance,"
the LLC agreement will almost invariably constitute an execu-
tory contract because the LLC itself will be a closely held,
member-managed enterprise.12s
ernor or manager fails to honor her fiduciary obligations, the LLC may termi-
nate her officer status.
121. By negative implication, because the non-officer member is not acting
in a managerial capacity, such member has no positional responsibilities and
no duty to carry out such responsibilities in good faith and in the "best inter-
ests" of the LLC. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 322B.69 (Supp. 1993) (standard of
conduct for managers).
122. MINN. STAT. § 322B.313(2) (Supp. 1993).
123. MINN. STAT. § 322B.306(4) (Supp. 1993).
124. See supra note 63 (noting that the accepted definition of "perform-
ance" includes omission to act, or negative performance).
Wrongful termination of the agreement destroys the terminator's continu-
ing membership interest, rendering such person a mere assignee of her rights
to profits and surplus. MINN. STAT. § 322B.306(3)(1) (Supp. 1993). Thus, the
remaining members need no longer perform by allowing such person to par-
ticipate in LLC management.
125. Clearly, a member's wrongful termination of the LLC agreement,
under any prevailing notions of contractual obligation, is a material breach.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241(a) (1981).
126. M INN. STAT. §§ 322B.306(4), .313 (Supp. 1993).
127. See MINN. STAT. § 322B.313(2) (Supp. 1993).
128. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. This analysis assumes the
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B. CASES HOLDING IPSO FACTO CLAUSES INVALID SHOULD
NOT APPLY TO THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE LLC
MEMBER
Once a court determines the LLC agreement is an execu-
tory contract, the court should examine partner bankruptcy
cases to ascertain whether their reasoning and policy analysis
hold true in the LLC context. Some courts have invalidated
partnership ipso facto clauses in the Chapter 11 and Chapter 7
contexts, relying on statutory interpretation and federal
supremacy. 2 9 Courts should reject their reasoning.
1. The Chapter 11 Context
The allure of partnership tax status induced the Act's
drafters to include an ipso facto clause as a means of defeating
the LLC's continuity of life.130 The ipso facto provision has the
dual effect of dissolving the LLC and terminating a member's
governance interest on such member's commencement of a
bankruptcy case.' 3 ' Courts have invalidated ipso facto clauses
in partnership agreements specifically because of the Chapter
11 context, arguing the UPA's drafters did not contemplate re-
organizations as acts of bankruptcy. 32
The Fifth Circuit has effectively refuted the legislative his-
tory argument espoused in In re Hawkins 3 3 and its progeny.134
court's application of Professor Countryman's definition of an executory con-
tract. The most narrow and exacting standard of executoriness, the Country-
man definition contemplates bilateral obligations so far unperformed that
failure to perform by either party would materially breach the contract and
excuse the other side from further performance. Countryman, supra note 10,
at 460.
The LLC agreement also meets the criteria identified in the other current
formulations of the executory contract. See supra note 65 (discussing various
tests for determining whether a contract is executory).
129. See In re Hawkins, 113 B.R. 315, 316 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990); In re
Corky Foods, 85 B.R. 903, 904 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988); In re BC & K Cattle Co.,
84 B.R. 69 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988); In re Safren, 65 B.R. 566, 569 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1986); In re Rittenhouse Carpet, Inc., 56 B.R. 131, 133 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1985).
130. See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text (setting forth the re-
quirements for obtaining partnership tax classification and the means through
which the Act's drafters secured this classification for LLC's); MMN. STAT.
§ 322B.80(1)(5)(viii) (Supp. 1993) (providing for LLC dissolution on the bank-
ruptcy of any partner).
131. See supra notes 27-28, 33 and accompanying text.
132. See e.g., Hawkins, 113 B.R. at 316.
133. See id
134. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently repudiated the reasoning
of Hawkins in In re Phillips, 966 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1992). Specifically, the
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Moreover, this argument clearly does not apply to member-
debtors under the Act. The intent relevant to interpreting the
Act is that of the enacting Minnesota legislature'3 5 which is
plainly cognizant of Chapter 11. Business reorganization bank-
ruptcy under Chapter 11 has existed for more than sixty
years; 3 6 petitioners under Chapter 11 are now treated identi-
cally with other Code petitioners and properly classified as
bankrupt.137 The legislature could have excluded Chapter 11
petitioners from the class of members whose bankruptcy causes
dissolution of the LLC, but did not and therefore must be as-
sumed to have contemplated their inclusion. Therefore, bank-
ruptcy courts should treat LLC ipso facto clauses uniformly
irrespective of the chapter under which a member seeks bank-
ruptcy protection.
2. Code Section 365(e)(1) and the Supremacy Clause Should
not Invalidate the Act's Ipso Facto Provision
Applying a unified analysis to LLC agreements as execu-
tory contracts, courts should refuse to invalidate the Act's ipso
facto provisions in cases under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11. Read
court critiqued In re Safren, 65 B.R. 566 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986), from which
Hawkins drew its analysis. See supra note 97. Discussing the Safren court's
method of statutory interpretation and its attempt to uphold debtors' rights
under state law, the court explained:
The court's entire policy argument concerns how to interpret state
law to effectuate a federal objective: partnership reorganization. But
the purpose of the state law construed by the court is not to preserve
the life of partnerships; as we have previously explained, that law
mandates partnership dissolution on partner bankruptcy to protect
the conflicting interests of the many interested parties when the legal
nature of the parties' relationships change as a result of a federal law.
Phillips, 966 F.2d at 931.
The court also criticized the Safren analysis for its reliance on the intent
of the UPA's drafters. Id Because California adopted the UPA 11 years after
business reorganization came into being, the adopting legislature's understand-
ing of the term "bankrupt" included Chapter 11 petitioners. Id
135. See, e.g., Phillips, 966 F.2d at 931 (criticizing the analysis of the Safren
court for failing to take into consideration the intent of the California legisla-
ture, which had full knowledge of Chapter 11 bankruptcy when adopting the
UPA, and yet made no attempt to disqualify Chapter 11 petitioners from the
class of bankrupt persons enumerated in the UPA).
136. Congress enacted the antecedents to Chapter 11 during the depression
years of the 1930s to allow for the business reorganizations of various types of
enterprises. Phillips, 966 F.2d at 930.
137. See Phillips, 966 F.2d at 931 ("Thus, we side with the many bank-
ruptcy courts that have interpreted various states' versions of the Uniform
Partnership Act to include Chapter 11 petitioners as 'bankrupts' under those
states' partnership laws").
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in isolation, the plain language of Code section 365(e)(1) pre-
vents dissolution and the corresponding termination of the
LLC member's governance interests. The Supremacy Clause
would therefore require deference to overriding federal bank-
ruptcy law, invalidating the Act's ipso facto termination clause.
Supremacy Clause analysis, however, presupposes a conflict be-
tween state and federal law. Where, as is the case with per-
sonal services contracts such as LLC agreements,13s federal law
allows for bankruptcy termination clauses, there is no conflict
between state and federal law.139
When courts conduct a Supremacy Clause analysis to de-
termine the validity of the Act's ipso facto clause, they must
consider sections 365(e)(2) and 365(c) of the Code.140 Failing to
conduct such an analysis contravenes the express will of
Congress.
C. APPLICABLE LAW EXCUSES NON-BANKRUPT MEMBERS
FROM SuBsTrruTE PERFORMANCE
The exceptions to the general rule invalidating ipso facto
clauses and allowing the trustee or DIP to assume an executory
contract apply to LLC agreements. The new Act excuses re-
maining non-bankrupt members from accepting substitute per-
formance from the trustee and the DIP.141 Section 365(e)(2)
ratifies ipso facto clauses where assumption of the contract
would entail rendering or accepting performance to or from the
"trustee or an... assignee."'4 Several cases in the partnership
context have held that the DIP becomes a legal entity different
from the debtor.143 The DIP assumes all of the trustee's pow-
138. Based on the second line of partner bankruptcy cases, this note con-
cludes that LLC agreements are personal services contracts.
139. Code § 365(e)(2) sanctions ipso facto clauses where applicable state
law excuses the remaining members from accepting non-consensual substitute
performance. The Act clearly prohibits substitute performance of the LLC
agreement. See MINN. STAT. § 322B.80 (Supp. 1993); see also La Sala, supra
note 9, at 634-35 (describing the lack of conflict between UPA and Code
provisions).
140. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1988) (describing circumstances under
which an executory contract may not be terminated) with 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(e)(2)(A)(i) (1988) (describing circumstances where § 365(e)(1) does not
apply).
141. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) (1988). The trustee or DIP may assume an
executory contract which would require a non-debtor to accept performance
from the "debtor or the debtor-in-possession." Id.
142. Id- § 365(e)(2).
143. See La Sala, supra note 9, at 633 & nn.82-86. The DIP assumes all of
the trustee's duties, and thus would obtain on assumption of the LLC agree-
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ers, and is thus a trustee, unable to assume the contract 44
If the contract survives the scrutiny of section 365(e)(2),
the trustee may assume the contract under section 365(c), pro-
vided that performance continues in the debtor or debtor in
possession.145 A bankrupt member's governance interests, how-
ever, are terminated consistent with federal law;14 therefore,
there is no contract to assume.147 Thus, if LLC agreements
constitute "personal services" executory contracts, section
365(e)(2) will apply and preclude assumption of the LLC
agreement.
D. THE PRINCIPLES EMBODIED IN THE EXCEPTIONS TO
ASSUMABILITY OF EXECUTORY CONTRACTS OBTAIN IN
THE LLC CONTEXT
Application of the two exceptions to the general rule of as-
sumability of executory contracts requires a finding that the
contract in question is a personal services contract. Courts
holding that partnership agreements are personal services con-
tracts have engaged in a multifaceted policy analysis to ex-
amine relational aspects of the enterprise. Exploration of the
same policies leads to the conclusion that LLC agreements are
personal services contracts.
LLCs will typically be closely held. Thus, like a partner-
ship, the task of choosing members will often rest on considera-
tions of trust: trust in a person's judgment and business
acumen, trust in a person's integrity, and trust based on per-
sonal friendship. Unlike a publicly traded corporation, the
LLC can exclude external ownership through mechanisms
other than stock price.148 Thus, the fiduciary rationale embod-
ment the "inherent conflict[s] of interest" which justify state law in excusing
the non-bankrupt members from rendering performance to the trustee.
144. I& at 633.
145. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (1988).
146. As § 365(e)(2) authorizes termination of the member-debtor's contract
rights, there is no conflict between the state and federal laws. Section 365(c)
must be read to allow assumption only where there exists a contract. If the
LLC agreement dissolves and a member's governance interest terminates law-
fully under § 365(e)(2), it follows that § 365(c) never enters into the analysis.
147. See Lewis R. Kaster & Jeffrey K. Cymbler, The Impact of A General
Partner's Bankruptcy Upon the Remaining Partners, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. &
Tr. J. 539, 546-51 (1986) (discussing the relationship between sections 365(e)(2)
and 365(c) and concluding that if the court gives effect to the ipso facto clause,
the contract is terminated along with the debtor's right to participate in enter-
prise management).
148. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.01 (West Supp. 1993), at 30 (Preface and
Overview Comments to Reporter's Notes).
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ied in case law construing partnership agreements in light of
Code section 365(e)(2) applies with equal vigor to the LLC
agreement.
Equally, allowing the trustee to assume a member's gov-
ernance interest promises to construct a significant conflict of
interest. The interests of bankruptcy creditors and LLC mem-
bers wishing to carry on the company diverge. Duty bound to
hold the LLC interest for the benefit of creditors, the trustee
thus faces the dilemma of serving two incompatible masters,
and acts favoring one may be quite detrimental to the other.14 9
Finally, substituting the trustee or DIP for the bankrupt
member would violate the identity principle. LLC members
did not contract with the trustee, nor the DIP, and should not
be compelled to accept performance from him. Allowing non-
consensual substitution of a member would in many cases in-
volve interference from an unknown, and unwanted, entity.
Prevailing law prohibits imposing a sentence of involuntary
servitude.
149. No cases have presented these specific issues yet. Courts in partner
bankruptcies presume a conflict of interest between the bankruptcy trustee
and the non-bankrupt partners because the trustee owes fiduciary duties to
both the estate and the partnership. It is relatively simple to construct hypo-
thetical situations raising conflicts of interest in the LLC context as well.
For example, consider the scenario of the non-bankrupt LLC members at-
tempting to incur long term debt. The Act authorizes LLC's to borrow money
and to secure the loan with encumbrances on LLC property. See MINN. STAT.
§ 322B.20(7) (Supp. 1993). Acquisition of secured debt is vital to the survival of
many enterprises. From the trustee's perspective, however, the return on in-
vestment may not occur for several years. Meanwhile, the terms of the Chap-
ter 11 plan call for payment of creditors on a regular schedule. If the
acquisition of debt reduces profitability in the short term, the trustee may be
forced to choose between the best interests of the LLC and the bankruptcy es-
tate.
Furthermore, to the extent the debt is secured, it creates further encum-
brances on LLC property, to which the bankrupt member has rights if the
LLC dissolves and winds up in the future. See MINN. STAT. § 322B.873 (Supp.
1993) (providing for liquidation and distribution of LLC assets to members af-
ter satisfaction of creditors). This may correspondingly reduce the value of
the bankrupt member's proportional share in those assets, and provide an-
other layer of creditors who might enter into the dispute over disposition of
the bankrupt's assets.
An even more clear cut example is a situation where the LLC members
wish to donate to charity. See MINN. STAT. § 322B.20(11) (Supp. 1993) (author-
izing charitable donations). Charitable donations may be advantageous to the
company from a tax standpoint, and also enhance the LLC's goodwill. To the
extent of such donations, however, the LLC deprives the estate of property,
and the trustee may have a duty as its representative to object to the donation,
even though it may be in the best interest of the LLC.
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CONCLUSION
The new Minnesota Limited Liability Company Act
presents an attractive business form for the entrepreneur, pro-
viding limited liability and classification as a partnership for
tax purposes. The bankruptcy of the LLC member presents a
dire problem because of the conflicting interests of the bank-
ruptcy estate and the remaining non-bankrupt members.
When considering a member's bankruptcy, courts should
apply an analysis congruent to that applied in the partnership
context. The existence of mutual duties and obligations be-
tween members of the LLC renders the LLC an executory con-
tract; the similarity of such duties and obligations to those of
partners in a partnership context makes analogy to the treat-
ment of partnership agreements in bankruptcy appropriate.
Courts should refuse to invalidate the Act's ipso facto
clause. Though the clause operates to dissolve the LLC and
divest the bankrupt member's governance in the company, the
Act, in harmony with federal bankruptcy law, excuses non-
bankrupt members from accepting substitute performance.
Reasoned policy analysis mandates a finding that LLC agree-
ments are personal services contracts, wholly within the ambit
of the two exceptions to the general rule of assumability of ex-
ecutory contracts. A member stands in a fiduciary relationship
with other company members. Interposing a new person,
either the trustee or the DIP, as a de facto trustee creates an
insoluble conflict of interest, as the substituted member's alle-
giance will always lie with the bankruptcy creditors. Moreover,
the substitute, even in the case of a DIP, is a new entity. The
other members of the LLC did not contract with this person,
and courts should not compel members involuntarily to conduct
operations with him.
Consistent with the more well-reasoned line of partnership
cases, courts should therefore conclude that LLC agreements
are personal services executory contracts, apply the exceptions
to the general rule of assumability, and uphold the Act's ipso
facto provisions. A bankrupt member should stand as a mere
assignee of an economic interest in the company, with all gov-
ernance rights terminating on petition for bankruptcy relief.
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